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Abstract
For national governments to meet their international climate change obligations they
need to develop and implement plans that involve coordinating the actions of local,
regional and national level actors from across multiple sectors. When this occurs, it
can lead to the formation of a policy implementation network. Surprisingly, there is a
limited understanding of the characteristics of the members of such networks, the
structure of the multi-level and cross-sectoral ties among them, and about how they
relate to how these networks are governed. This paper initiates the development of
such knowledge by calculating a variety of network statistics to analyse the policy
implementation network formed to carry out Ireland's signature climate policy—The
Climate Action Plan 2019. Results show that national level actors dominate, and that
cross-level and cross-sectoral collaboration are limited. The plan is governed by a
network administrative organisation (NAO), with the Department of the Taoiseach
(Irish Prime Minister) filling the role. How the network is structured and governed
increases the likelihood that the network will be stable, have a unity of purpose and
be able to meet its objectives. However, the dominance of national-level actors and
its centralized structure are likely to make it challenging for the NAO to gain the sup-
port of local-level actors. This paper's methodological approach can be applied in
other contexts to understand inter-actor relations and how these affect the responsi-
bilities, challenges and opportunities of the actors involved in the implementation of
a national environmental policy.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Mitigating the effects of anthropogenic climate change is amongst the
biggest challenges facing humankind. Under the Paris climate accord,
nation states are now a key arena where actions to address the prob-
lem are taken. Consequently, many national governments are now
devising national plans and strategies to outline how they will reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions. Because of the complexity of the cli-
mate problem, it is imperative that these plans consider the multi-level
and cross-sectoral nature of the challenge. Indeed, the Summary for
Policymakers of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C
stresses that addressing climate change requires accountable multi-
level governance that involves a variety of state and non-state actors
and institutions (IPCC, 2018). For national governments to meet their
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international obligations they will need to involve and coordinate the
actions of local, regional, national and international level actors from
across multiple sectors when developing and implementing their
plans. When this occurs, it leads to the formation of purpose-oriented
policy implementation networks, which can be defined as ‘a network
comprised of three or more autonomous actors who participate in a
joint effort based on a common purpose’ (Carboni et al., 2019).
There is no consensus in the literature about how best to evalu-
ate a policy implementation network (Kenis & Provan, 2009). This is
because any choice of evaluation criteria is shaped by normative
values rather than by objective facts. This has led researchers to rely
on a variety of different theoretical frameworks and to use a range of
different measures (Raab et al., 2015; Turrini et al., 2010). Scholars
have examined the initial conditions that enable the formation of
these networks to explain how their purpose came to be defined
(Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson et al., 2012). They have investigated the
size and the diversity of a network's membership to ascertain which
resources are available and mobilized, to identify potential sources of
conflict and to determine the network's stability (Dal Molin &
Masella, 2016; Saz-Carranza & Ospina, 2011; Sørensen &
Torfing, 2009). Public management researchers have focused on how
these networks are governed to understand how decisions are taken
and to see if cooperation is formalized (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999;
Provan & Kenis, 2008; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Others have con-
centrated on outcome variables, such as participants' evaluations and
perceptions of legitimacy (Provan & Milward, 1995), the extent to
which a network meets its own performance indicators (Sørensen &
Torfing, 2009; Van Raaij, 2006) and how the network is evaluated by
the broader community (O'Toole & Meier, 2004).
Surprisingly, we have a very limited understanding of the charac-
teristics of the members of these networks, the structure of the multi-
level and cross-sectoral ties among them, and about how this is
related to how they are governed. There is therefore a need to
develop such a body of knowledge (Park & Lim, 2018). This paper
takes a preliminary step in this direction by analysing the network cre-
ated to implement the Irish Climate Action Plan 2019 (DCCAE, 2019).
The paper focuses on analysing the network structure and how it is
governed rather than on outcomes for three reasons. First and fore-
most, at this early stage it is not possible to know if the plan will achieve
its objectives of leading Ireland to meet its 2030 EU emissions reduc-
tion targets and of laying the foundations for achieving net zero carbon
emissions by 2050. Put simply, because the Climate Action Plan is at
the start of its life it is too early to evaluate its outcomes. Second, in the
absence of the counterfactual where no plan was created, it is not pos-
sible to evaluate the relative contribution of the plan to the Irish state's
emissions reduction obligations. Third, evaluating a plan to tackle cli-
mate change by counting the number of actions that the government
has successfully implemented in its own plan could be argued to be akin
to allowing the government to set its own test and then issuing its own
report card. In fact, the government has undertaken such a review on a
quarterly basis since the Plan's publication in June 2019.
The next section presents our theoretical framework: the first
part introduces policy implementation networks and discusses what
we can learn from analysing their structure; the second part discusses
how these networks are governed. We then describe our case, the
data and the network methods that we use to address our research
questions: (i) What are the characteristics of the members of the net-
work and how are the multi-level and cross-sectoral relationships
among them structured? (ii) How is the network governed? (Carboni
et al., 2019; Planko et al., 2017; Turrini et al., 2010). Following this,
we present our results and discuss our findings. The paper then con-
cludes with some reflections on the study and some thoughts about
directions for future research.
2 | POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
NETWORKS
The complex web of interactions that characterize the relationships
among the actors involved in the delivery of a policy programme is a
networked phenomenon. The actors and the relationships among them
can therefore be conceptualized as a policy implementation network
(Milward & Provan, 2003). Purpose-oriented policy implementation net-
works are comprised of actors that interact to solve some common
problem that no actor could address alone (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).
These networks are formally constituted multi-actor arrangements set
up by government as a means of coordinating the effective delivery of
a public service or the implementation of a policy (Isett et al., 2011).
They are also meso-level social structures that consist of a configuration
of horizontal and vertical relationships among interdependent actors,
and which can include a combination of local, national, regional and
international actors from across multiple sectors. By studying a policy
implementation network, we can elucidate the structural pattern of the
relationships between the network's members and determine how their
actions are coordinated to meet the network's purpose. We can also
establish how different actors are integrated, where power and control
reside, identify which actors are responsible or co-responsible for which
tasks, and explain how it is governed (Planko et al., 2017).
2.1 | Network structure
The way in which actors are integrated into a network is shaped by
the number of ties among its members, the degree of network central-
ization, and the extent to which some actors occupy more central
positions than others. Networks that are better connected usually
enable information to flow more efficiently than those that are
sparsely connected. In centralized networks, the actors in central posi-
tions can channel information to others while also prioritizing network
tasks (Sandström & Carlsson, 2008). Centralized networks have been
found to be better for coordination and are thought to work especially
well in public service delivery if institutional norms support coopera-
tion and collaboration (Provan & Milward, 1995). Accordingly, our
analysis of the Irish Climate Action Plan's implementation network
begins by investigating how connected and centralized it is, and by
identifying the most central actors.
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There is a need to distinguish between the vertical and the hori-
zontal dimensions of networked policy implementation, especially for
problems like climate change that require a multi-level and cross-
sectoral approach. The vertical dimension refers to the relationships
between local, regional, national and international actors. The horizon-
tal dimension refers to the relationships between actors from differ-
ent sectors. Multi-level governance as a concept for understanding
environmental protection emerged from the Earth Summit in 1992.
The approach has been widely used to understand the dynamics of
climate governance (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Di Gregorio et al., 2019;
Schreurs, 2017). Multi-level climate governance refers to the ways in
which the actions of actors that putatively operate at different levels
of governance are engaged and coordinated to develop, implement
and monitor policies designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
(Westman et al., 2019). The approach recognizes the existence and
the role of mutually interdependent actors from multiple different pol-
icy sectors that operate at different governance scales and which are
involved in the resolution of a policy problem. The approach is
employed because it is presumed that it can help close the policy gaps
between levels of government through vertical and horizontal
cooperation.
Cross-sectoral collaboration refers to situations where govern-
ment actors work with organizations from across sectors to address a
public problem that they cannot address alone (Bryson et al., 2015). It
is argued that a policy problem is more likely to be comprehensively
addressed when actors from different sectors collaborate than if they
and the government were to work independently (Kettl, 2015;
Rethemeyer, 2005). The approach can be of particular benefit when
the knowledge and the capacities needed to address a problem are
held by a range of different actors with expertise in complementary
areas of relevance. Collaborations between actors from different sec-
tors may be instigated by network managers if they believe that the
separate efforts of these actors have failed or are likely to fail to
address a problem (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Their success can
depend on the existence of a consensus among participants that a
problem exists, that the participating actors trust one another, that
they agree that a collaborative approach is necessary, that they under-
stand the structure of the network and how it is governed and are
familiar with the processes being used to meet the network's objec-
tives (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006). The second step in
our analysis is to investigate how actors from different sectors and
from different governance levels are integrated into the implementa-
tion network created by the development of the Irish Climate
Action Plan.
An analysis of cross-sectoral and cross-level collaboration contrib-
utes to the understanding of climate policy integration (Adelle &
Russel, 2013; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010;
Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Because climate change is a policy prob-
lem that touches all sectors of society, from transportation to indus-
trial production, from agriculture to housing and urban planning and
beyond, it can only be addressed through governance solutions that
integrate climate policy with policies in these various sectors. The cli-
mate policy implementation network that we analyse is an attempt to
do so by bringing together actors representing various sectors and by
giving them tasks that integrate climate policies into the policy sectors
in which these actors already occupy key places. Our object of study,
thus, is an example of what van Asselt, Rayner and Persson (2015,
p. 389) identify as the administrative coordination approach to climate
policy integration, though we are unable to differentiate in this study
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ variants of climate policy integration.
Understanding the potential and the challenges of the climate policy
implementation network, therefore, is a part of understanding climate
policy integration more generally.
2.2 | Mode of governance
Governance refers to how decisions are made, how power is shared,
and how cooperation is engendered (O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Much of
the literature on governance and policy implementation networks has
sought to understand how public authorities or network managers
foster cooperation and coordinate the interactions among network
actors so that policies can be implemented effectively (Gronow
et al., 2019; Klijn et al., 2010; Provan & Milward, 2001). Provan and
Kenis' (2008) widely cited paper on modes of network governance
identifies and classifies three forms of network governance. According
to the shared governance model, the number of participating actors in
a network is small and power is widely distributed. All the participat-
ing actors contribute relatively evenly to the management and
steering of the network's activities, with decisions being made based
on consensus about the network's goals and about how they are to be
achieved. In the lead agency model, one actor is responsible for man-
aging a network's activities. The level of consensus about the net-
work's goals are moderate, but because most of the power is
concentrated in the hands of one key member of the network the
capacity of the network to develop positive outcomes is highly depen-
dent on the level of trust among actors. The network administrative
organisation (NAO) model is similar to the lead agency model. The
main difference is that NAOs are not key members of the network
that they manage, but instead are separate entities that exist to man-
age or oversee the activities of the network actors. We address our
second questioning by determining which of these three forms of
networked governance best describes how the Climate Action Plan is
governed.
3 | IRISH CLIMATE POLICY AND THE
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2019
Ireland is a climate laggard (Little, 2017; Torney & O'Gorman, 2019).
The country has the third highest per-capita emissions in the EU and
placed 41st in the Climate Change Performance Index 2020, making it
among the worst performers in Europe (Germanwatch, 2019). In its
2018 annual review of the country's progress towards its targets, the
Climate Change Advisory Council concluded that Ireland was
‘completely off course’ and described future projections as
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‘disturbing’ (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2018). The Irish Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) projected that if no additional
measures are implemented (beyond those in place in 2019) then
greenhouse gas emissions in sectors outside of the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme would decrease by 5% by 2020, meaning that Ireland
will fall far short of the required 20% reduction from 2005 levels. In
the past, Irish climate policy choices have aligned with the preferences
of powerful interests and those involved in Irish climate politics have
failed to learn from those with which they disagree (Torney, 2017;
Wagner & Ylä-Anttila, 2018; Wagner & Ylä-Anttila, 2020). The coun-
try will need to radically change the breadth, the depth and the
urgency of its response to climate change if it is to meet its emissions
reductions obligations.
Against this background, the Irish parliament tasked a Citizens'
Assembly with deliberating on the topic of ‘how the state can make
Ireland a leader in tackling climate change’. In autumn 2017, the
assembly considered complex policy questions related to climate
change in a comprehensive and deliberative way (Devaney, Brereton,
et al., 2020; Devaney, Torney, et al., 2020). After hearing from a range
of scientists and policy experts, the members published a list of
13 high-level recommendations in April 2018 (Citizens'
Assembly, 2018). Their report showed that Irish citizens wanted the
government to be far more ambitious in their response to climate
change than it had been to date.
A Joint Oireachtas (Irish parliament) Committee on Climate Action
was established in autumn 2018 to consider the Assembly's recom-
mendations as well as additional evidence presented to the Commit-
tee during its deliberations. In March 2019, the committee published
a report, Climate Change: A Cross Party Consensus on Climate Action
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019), which set out over 40 recommenda-
tions to steer Ireland towards a low carbon future. The Irish parlia-
ment unanimously endorsed the plan as part of a resolution declaring
a ‘climate and biodiversity emergency’. With that, there was a con-
sensus that the Irish state needed to drastically improve its response
to climate change.
Soon after, in June 2019, the government published the all-
of-government Climate Action Plan 2019. The purpose of the plan is
to provide the details of how the state intends to meet its EU target
of reducing its carbon emissions by 30% between 2021 and 2030 and
creating a resilient, vibrant and sustainable country (DCCAE, 2019).
The plan contains 183 actions within 13 different policy areas that
extend to all sectors of Irish society and its economy. For each action,
the plan sets out the steps necessary for delivery, a timeline for deliv-
ery and the actor/s responsible for ensuring delivery. Progress can
therefore be tracked and measured. It is a cross-sectoral plan in that it
includes measures across the sectors responsible for Ireland's green-
house gas emissions. The plan takes a multi-level governance
approach, by including local, regional, national and international actors
and detailing their roles in implementing the actions in the plan.
The plan proposes a new governance framework to ensure over-
sight and accountability to replace the existing framework set out in
the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015. The plan
establishes a Climate Action Delivery Board within the Department of
the Taoiseach, co-chaired by the Secretary General to the Govern-
ment (the most senior civil servant and head of the Department of the
Taoiseach) and the Secretary General of the Department of Commu-
nications, Climate Action and Environment, to oversee the delivery of
all the actions in the plan and to ensure that Government departments
and public bodies are held accountable. It calls for the establishment
of a standing committee of the Oireachtas focused on climate change
to hold government departments and public bodies to account for the
actions on climate change. It will also establish a Climate Action Coun-
cil (CAC) as a successor to the existing Climate Change Advisory
Council. The purpose of the CAC will be to advise and monitor Gov-
ernment progress in reducing emissions.
4 | DATA AND METHODS
Social network analysis (SNA) is a set of relational methods for identi-
fying, mapping and measuring connections between people, groups,
or organizations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Any of these entities
can be the nodes in a network, while the connections between them
can encompass any type of relationship or flow of resources.
We draw our network data from the Climate Action Plan 2019: To
Tackle Climate Breakdown (DCCAE, 2019). The boundary of the net-
work therefore only extends to those actors that are specifically
named as being responsible for at least one action in the plan. As such,
the boundary is defined and limited by the plan, and our data is for
the whole network. There are 109 actors named as being either
responsible or co-responsible for at least one action in the plan.1 We
use the Irish State Administration Database to categorize each actor
according to the sector within which they primarily operate
(Hardiman et al., 20202). There are 183 actions detailed in the plan.
Many of these actions require several steps to be taken in order to be
delivered. For our analysis, a tie exists between two actors if they are
responsible for any step that is part of the same action. For example,
Table 1 shows that for Action 56 that there are three steps necessary
for delivery (left side) and that there are three different actors
involved in at least one step of the action (right side). In our network,
a network tie is present between each possible pair of the three
actors involved in Action 56: (i) Sustainable Energy Authority of Ire-
land, (ii) Dept. of Housing, Planning and Local Government, (iii) Dept.
of Communications, Climate Action and Environment.
In a two-mode network, nodes are divided into two sets X and
Y (referred to as modes), where only ties between nodes in different sets
are possible. In our analysis, the actors are the first node type, while the
actions are the second. As such, we use our data to create an n x m adja-
cency matrix where the rows are the 109 actors and the columns are the
183 actions. We multiply this n  m adjacency matrix by its transpose to
construct an ‘Actor by Actor’ square matrix. In this matrix, the rows and
the columns are actors and the cells contain the number of actions that
each pair of actors ij are jointly responsible for. In this study, we analyse a
binary transformation of this ‘Actor by Actor’ matrix, where the presence
or the absence of the co-responsibility for at least one action between a
pair of actors ij is encoded using binary elements.
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4.1 | Structural properties
We calculate two statistics for the structural properties of the network:
network density and network centralization. Network density is the pro-
portion of the potential ties in a network that are actual ties. The higher
the density in a network, the more ties that there are between the net-
work's actors. Network centralization is a measure of the extent to which
the actors in a network have a tie or ties with a focal actor or a subset of
actors. Network centralization measures range from 0 to 1, where
0 means all actors have the same level of centrality and 1 indicates a max-
imally centralized network. The more centralized a network, the more
centred the actors are around the focal actor/s. We perform conditional
uniform graph tests on both statistics to investigate if the network is
more/less dense or more/less centralized than would occur by chance.
4.2 | Actor centrality
We calculate two measures of network centrality: degree centrality and
betweenness centrality. Degree centrality counts the number of ties that
an actor has to others in the network and is an indicator of prominence.
The betweenness centrality metric is a measure of centrality based on the
shortest paths between pairs of actors. Those with higher betweenness
centrality scores occupy more linking positions, indicating that they more
often act as an intermediary actor or bridge between otherwise uncon-
nected actors. These statistics enable us to ascertain the sector and the
level of governance of the most central actors in the network.
4.3 | Multi-level and cross-sectoral analysis
We use two methods to investigate if actors from the same or different
governance levels tend to be co-responsible for the same actions (cross-
and multi- level interactions) and if actors from the same or different
sectors tend to be co-responsible for the same actions (intra- and cross-
sectoral interactions). First, we calculate an E–I Index measure for
homophily, which compares internal and external group ties (Krackhardt &
Stern, 1988). The index ranges from 1 (complete homophily) to +1
(complete heterophily). We perform permutation tests on the observed
E–I values to assess if they are statistically significantly. Second, we esti-
mate ANOVA density models to investigate whether the distribution of
ties between levels (and between sectors) is uniform or whether there
was significant variance in cross-level (cross-sectoral) densities.
5 | RESULTS
The conditional uniform graph tests show that the density of the net-
work (0.13) is lower than would occur by chance (Figure 1) and that
the network is more centralized (0.69) than would occur by chance
(Figure 2). The network is dominated by national level actors (Table 2),
with only one non-national level actor amongst the 10 actors
TABLE 1 Action 56 from the climate action plan
Action 56: All new buildings (public and private) to be near zero
energy building (NZEB)
Steps necessary for delivery Actors responsible for action
1. Publish methodology for




– Dept. of Housing, Planning
and Local Government
2. Implementation of tighter
regulations on major
renovations
• Transpose energy performance
of buildings directive legislation
into law for major renovations
and nearly zero energy
buildings




regulations to NZEB standards
to facilitate phasing out the




– Dept. of Housing, Planning
and Local Government
– Dept. of Communications,
Climate Action and
Environment
F IGURE 1 Conditional
uniform graph density. Density,
controlling for network size
[Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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responsible for the most actions—the local authorities, which encom-
passes all 31 local councils (Table 3). Actors from just three sectors
make up over half the actors in the network (Table 4). The two actors
responsible and co-responsible for the most actions are from the Envi-
ronmental Protection sector (Tables 4 and 5). The same two actors
are linked to the most otherwise unconnected actors (Table 6).
Figure 3 shows that the mean degree of actor centrality by gover-
nance level decreases from national, to local, to regional and then to
international. National level actors are on average co-responsible for
more actions than the actors from any other level, and that interna-
tional actors are co-responsible for the least number of actions. The
mean betweenness centrality scores decrease in the same order, indi-
cating that national level actors are on average linking more otherwise
unconnected actors than actors from any other level. No international
actors link otherwise unconnected actors. National level actors are
therefore not only responsible or co-responsible for implementing
more of the actions in the plan than others, but they are also the pri-
mary bridge between actors at other levels.
Figure 4 shows that the actors with the highest mean degree of
actions for which they are co-responsible come from three sectors:
Environmental Protection; Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; and the
Housing and Community Amenities. Actors from the same three sec-
tors also have the highest mean betweenness centrality scores, indi-
cating that they more often than others provide a link between
otherwise unconnected actors.
The E-I index for homophilous ties between actors at the same
level of governance is 0.417 and statistically significant. This indi-
cates that actors are more likely than chance to share responsibility
for actions with actors that operate at the same level of governance
as themselves. Actors at all four governance levels have more ties to
those that operate at the same level as themselves than they do
to actors at a different level (Figure 5). The results from the ANOVA
density model are not significant for any pair of governance levels,
indicating that that there is no variance in the cross-level densities.
This means that there are no two governance levels where the actors
therein are more densely connected to one another than the actors in
any other two governance levels.
The E–I index for homophilous ties between actors from the same
sector is 0.645 and not statistically significant. This indicates that
there are not more or less instances of cooperation between actors
from different sectors than would occur by chance. The ANOVA den-
sity model results are not significant for any pair of sectors, indicating
that that there is no variance in the cross-sectoral densities. This
means that there are not any two sectors that are more densely con-
nected to one another than any other pair. Figure 6 shows the density
of the ties between the actors from the 12 different sectors.
The second motivating question of our study concerns how the
network is governed. The findings of our network analysis seem to
suggest that the Climate Action Plan's implementation network most
closely resembles the lead agency governance model described by
Provan and Kenis (2008), with the Department of Communications,
Climate Action and Environment (which drew up the plan) acting as
the network's lead organization. The Department is responsible or co-
responsible for more actions than any other actor and acts as an inter-
mediary between more otherwise unconnected actors than any other
actor.
However, looks can deceive. As noted above, as part of the gov-
ernance reforms introduced by the Climate Action Plan, a Climate
Action Delivery Board has been established within the Department of
the Taoiseach. The stated role of this body is to ‘hold each depart-
ment and public body accountable for the delivery of actions set out
in the Climate Action Plan’ (DCCAE, 2019, p. 37). To fulfil this role, a
new Climate Action Unit was established within the Department of
the Taoiseach in summer 2019 in support of the Delivery Board
F IGURE 2 Conditional
uniform graph test. Degree
centralization, controlling for
network size [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(Government of Ireland, 2020). This unit plays a central role in moni-
toring and driving implementation of the actions set out in the Climate
Action Plan. This task is carried out through quarterly reporting under
which the responsible lead department over each action is required to
provide an update on delivery and/or report on any delays. Under the
system developed, responsible lead departments are required to
provide regular indications of progress throughout the quarter, antici-
pating any challenges to timely implementation. This is followed by
ongoing interaction between the Department of the Taoiseach's Cli-
mate Action Unit and the relevant lead department until the end of
the quarter and the escalation of issues through relevant government
structures (including the Climate Action Delivery Board and the rele-
vant Cabinet Committee) in a bid to unblock any implementation chal-
lenges experienced. The Climate Action Unit is responsible for
collating updates and publishing the quarterly implementation reports
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2019).
Because of the central role of the Department of the Taoiseach in
driving implementation through monitoring, reporting, and facilitation,
we characterize the network structure not as a lead agency gover-
nance model but rather as a network administrative organisation
(NAO) model. As discussed above, the NAO model is similar to the
lead agency model, the main difference being that the NAO is not a
key member of the network that they manage. This captures well the
role that the Department of the Taoiseach plays in seeing the plan
implemented. It is responsible for very few actions in the Climate
Action Plan, the majority of which concern how the plan is governed.
For example, Action 2—the establishment of the Climate Action Deliv-
ery Board—is central to the governance of the policy implementation
network.
6 | DISCUSSION
Since the adoption of the 2015 Paris Climate Accord, nation states
have become the key arena where actions to reduce global green-
house gas emissions are devised and taken. Under the agreement, sig-
natory countries are obliged to set out their nationally determined
contributions to reducing global GHG emissions. To meet the multi-
level and cross-sectoral climate governance challenge (Gupta, 2007),
national governments will need to involve public, private and third
sectors actors in the integration of climate policies into the sectors in
which they operate (van Asselt et al., 2015). Where a network has
been formed to implement national climate policies, the characteris-
tics of the members of that network, the nature of the relationships
among the network actors, and how their actions and interactions are
governed will shape how the network functions and how it performs
(Sandström & Carlsson, 2008).
The network literature usually argues that successful collective
action is more likely when network density is higher. This is because
when actors have more ties to others, it is assumed that they are more
likely to stay engaged in resolving whatever problems that they are
jointly addressing (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). However, in a network
where the number of interactions among actors is low, such as that
which is analysed here, the presence of a central actor with the
responsibility for network management, such as the Department of
the Taoiseach in the NAO role, can reduce opportunistic behaviour
while also combatting apathy and fatigue by monitoring and coordi-
nating the activities of actors (Emerson et al., 2012; Provan &
TABLE 3 Actors responsible for the most actions
No. of actions Sector Level
1. Dept. of Communications, Climate Action and
Environment
110 Environmental protection National
2. Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 67 Environmental protection National
3. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 44 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
4. Dept. of Housing, Planning and Local Government 43 Housing and community amenities National
5. Teagasc 28 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
6. Dept. of Transport, Tourism, and Sport 25 Transport National
7. Dept. of Business, Enterprise and Innovation 23 Enterprise and economic development National
8. Dept. of Public Expenditure and Reform 22 General public services National
9. Local Authorities 21 General public services Local
10. Commission for Regulation of Utilities 20 General public services National
TABLE 4 Sectors of network actors
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry 8 7%
Education and training 17 16%
Enterprise and economic development 30 28%
Environmental protection 9 8%
General public services 21 19%
Health 1 1%
Housing and community amenities 5 5%
Public order and safety 4 3%
Recreation, culture, religion 2 2%
Science and technology 3 3%
Social protection 3 3%
Transport 7 6%
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Kenis, 2008). Indeed, networks can be more effective at meeting their
objectives when they are centralized and not densely connected
(Provan & Milward, 1995). This is because densely connected networks
that are also highly centralized can be inefficient because of the amount
of time, effort, and resources that are used to build and maintain redun-
dant connections. That said, a highly centralized network that in theory
is conducive to efficient coordination might still fail to address the pol-
icy problem for which it was constituted if the network manager shows
little interest in doing a good job (Bodin, 2017).
Figure 7 shows the governance level of the actors involved in the
implementation of the actions outlined in each of the plan's 13 policy
areas. The Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use section of the plan is
the only area where actors from all governance levels are involved.
The actions in the Citizen Engagement section of the plan involve
both the most local and the most regional actors, while the actions in
the Built Environment section of the plan involves the most national
level actors. There are three sections where only national level actors
are involved: Where We Stand; Governance of the Challenge; and
International Action.
Our analysis shows that actors in the network tend to have more
within-level than cross-level ties. These results are similar to those of
studies that have analysed the structure of environmental governance
networks (Hamilton et al., 2018, 2020). When actors primarily engage
with other actors that operate at the same governance level as them-
selves, they can focus on the issues that are more salient than the
issues being addressed at higher or lower levels (Hamilton
et al., 2018). This also contributes to the creation of the bonding ties
that generate the social capital that is crucial for successful collective
action (Berardo, 2014). While cross-level collaboration is a necessary
condition for effective multi-level governance, it is not sufficient.
Fruitful cooperation between actors operating at different governance
levels is also necessary. Networks with structures that create both
bridging and bonding social capital have been found to better enable
collective action (Agnitsch et al., 2006). Actors that connect across
levels by circulating or distributing knowledge and material resources
throughout the network play a crucial role in how well a network
functions (Cash et al., 2003; Di Gregorio et al., 2019; Lemos &
Morehouse, 2005). Two national level organizations—the Sustainable
TABLE 6 Ten most central actors (normalized betweenness centralized)
Actor Betweenness Sector Level
1. Dept. of Communications, Climate Action and
Environment
0.254 Environmental protection National
2. Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 0.195 Environmental protection National
3. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 0.085 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
4. Dept. of Housing, Planning and Local Government 0.073 Housing and community amenities National
5. Dept. of Transport, Tourism, and Sport 0.050 Transport National
6. Local Authorities 0.040 General public services Local
7. Dept. of Business, Enterprise and Innovation 0.039 Enterprise and economic development National
8. Environmental Protection Agency 0.036 Environmental protection National
9. Teagasc 0.032 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
10. National Transport Authority 0.026 Transport National
TABLE 5 Ten most central actors (co-responsibility)
Actor Co-responsible Sector Level
1. Dept. of Communications, Climate Action and
Environment
87 Environmental protection National
2. Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland 85 Environmental protection National
3. Dept. of Housing, Planning and Local Government 60 Housing and community amenities National
4. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 59 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
5. Environmental Protection Agency 48 Environmental protection National
6. Dept. of Business, Enterprise and Innovation 48 Enterprise and economic development National
7. Local Authorities 45 General public services Local
8. Dept. of Transport, Tourism, and Sport 37 Transport National
9. Teagasc 36 Agriculture, fisheries and forestry National
10. Enterprise Ireland 36 Enterprise and economic development National
Note: The number of other actors with which they share responsibility for implementing an action. Multiple actors can be responsible for an action. Nine in
the case of Action 38.
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Energy Authority of Ireland and the Department of Communications,
Climate Action and Environment—are most often in the position of
being a bridge between pairs of actors at different governance levels,
filling what are known as structural holes in network theory
(Burt, 1992). As such, these two actors play a pivotal role in circulating
resources throughout the network and in communicating knowledge
learned during policy implementation to the NAO. Due to their network
position, the learning that they engage in, and which they facilitate, can
contribute positively to helping the network achieve its objectives. The
two actors can play a key role in building trust (Luo, 2005), in managing
conflict (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and in ensuring that actors
keep working together towards achieving the network's goals.
F IGURE 3 Mean and standard deviation of centrality by governance level [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 4 Mean and standard deviation of centrality measures by sector [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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F IGURE 5 Density of ties between
actors at different governance levels
(ANOVA density model results are not
significant for any pair of governance
levels) [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 6 Density of ties between
actors by sectors (ANOVA density model
results are not significant for any pair of
governance levels). AFF, agriculture,
fisheries and forestry; EED, enterprise and
economic development; EP,
environmental protection; ET, education
and training; GPS, general public
services; H, health; HCA, housing and
community amenities; POS, public order
and safety; RCR, recreation, culture,
religion; S&T, science and technology; SP,
social protection; T, transport [Color
figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Tackling tough problems like climate change in a way that
achieves beneficial community outcomes often requires that actors
from multiple sectors collaborate with one another (Bryson
et al., 2006; Rethemeyer, 2005). However, cross-sectoral collabora-
tion does not guarantee success (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010) and
organizations from different sectors are usually better off only engag-
ing in collaborative behaviour when it enables them to achieve some
outcome that could not be achieved by working alone (Bryson
et al., 2015). In the network analysed in this study, there is not more
cross-sectoral responsibility for actions in the plan than would occur
by chance. There is also no set of actors from any two sectors that are
more often responsible for the same actions than there are from any
other two sectors. Notwithstanding these observations, 82% of all the
actions in the plan do involve actors from at least two different sec-
tors (Figure 8). Actions related to the Built Environment involve actors
from the greatest number of sectors—all except Public Order and
Safety. The implementation of Built Environment actions also involves
the joint largest number of actors, alongside the Citizen Engagement
policy area, which involves actors from eight different sectors. Four
other policy areas involve actors from eight different sectors: Adapta-
tion; Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use; Carbon Pricing and Cross-
cutting Policies; and Electricity. Actions related to Where We Stand
and to Ireland's International Action on Climate Breakdown involve
the fewest number of actors, while actions related to Where We
Stand and to the Governance of the Challenge involve actors from the
fewest number of different sectors.
Cross-sectoral collaboration is more likely to be successful when
individual actors are tied to one another through multiple linking
mechanisms (Bryson et al., 2006), such as bridging actors and having a
shared responsibility for specific tasks (Logsdon, 1991). Conversely,
success is much less likely when there is no agreement on task alloca-
tion or a shared understanding of the purpose of collaboration
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The Climate Action Plan assigns responsi-
bility for specific actions in the plan to specific actors, which favours
the likelihood of successful instances of cross-sectoral collaboration.
The two bridging actors in the network, identified above, come from
the Environmental Protection sector. The interests of this sector are
often portrayed as being at odds with those of actors from the indus-
trial, agricultural or transport sectors. As such, how successfully
actions that require cross-sectoral collaboration will depend to some
degree on how well these two bridging actors can contribute towards
building trust among actors from sectors that may not trust one
another (Human & Provan, 2000) and in helping actors understand
that successful implementation of the plan is in both their and the
public's interest (Bryson et al., 2015).
That the Climate Action Plan is dominated by national level actors
is not surprising given that Ireland is one of the most centralized
states in Europe, with local or regional actors having few responsibili-
ties or resources. A policy developed to address climate change needs
to take seriously the multi-level nature of the problem (Hanssen
et al., 2013). A policy implementation network dominated by national
level actors gives disproportionately less power to local actors, dis-
tances those responsible for action from local communities, makes it
more difficult for those geographically distant from the centre of
power to hold accountable those in charge and is less likely to be able
to address the heterogeneous preferences of citizens. Policymakers
might consider how having so few non-national level actors involved
in the plan impacts on its proposal to substantially increase public
F IGURE 7 Policy sector of actions and the governance level of the actors involved in their implementation [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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engagement with climate change, particularly, in relation to its plan to
establish initiatives to educate, engage, motivate, and empower peo-
ple to take climate action. That there are not more interactions
between actors from different sectors than would occur by chance is
perhaps less of a problem, especially when we consider that nearly of
all the actions in the plan do involve actors from at least two sectors.
If not the case already, it might make sense to re-examine all the
actions in the plan to determine if there are any that could be more
effectively implemented if actors from sectors not already involved in
their implementation were brought on board.
7 | CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the Irish Climate Action Plan as a policy imple-
mentation network to develop our understanding of the multi-level
and cross-sectoral nature of these types of networks. It approached
this task by asking: (i) What are the characteristics of the members of
the network and how are the relationships among them structured?
(ii) How is it governed? We applied network methods to ascertain the
extent to which the plan is an exercise in multi-level and cross-
sectoral policy implementation and to uncover the governance levels
and sectors from which the most central actors in the network oper-
ate. With this understanding of the network's structure, we then con-
sidered which mode of governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008) best
describes how the network is governed, concluding that it is governed
by network administrative organisation (NAO). We acknowledge that
understanding a policy implementation network involves more than
just mapping and analysing the relationships among the actors
involved in the plan. Nevertheless, we contend that analysing these
relations is an important first step for understanding a network's
structure and for determining how the activities of participating actors
might be monitored, coordinated and managed. It also allows us to
reflect on the likelihood of the plan successfully meeting its stated
objectives.
This paper's most significant contribution to the literature on
environmental governance is its conceptualization and analysis of a
policy implementation network as a multi-level and cross-sectoral
phenomenon. We argue that taking this perspective better equips us
to understand inter-actor power relations and how these affect the
responsibilities, challenges and opportunities of the actors involved in
the implementation of a public policy.
The literature on policy implementation networks offers some
hints about the likely performance of a network constituted and
governed as the one analysed here. The stable structure of NAO-
governed networks makes them the most effective for guiding the
behaviour of network actors and for limiting the extent to which
actors pursue their own interests, thereby improving the chances that
it achieves its goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rodriguez et al., 2007;
Røiseland, 2011). These networks are also best placed for managing
the tensions of internal/external legitimacy and efficiency/inclusive-
ness (Provan & Kenis, 2008). NAOs can strike a balance between the
tension between internal and external legitimacy by organizing and
overseeing the actions and interactions among network actors, while
simultaneously taking on the role as the public face or representative
of the network. The NAO (Department of the Taoiseach) responsible
for governing the Climate Action Plan is therefore more likely to see
the plan achieve its objectives if it can obtain the support and
F IGURE 8 Policy sector of actions and the sector of the actors involved in their implementation [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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approval of both the public and the network actors. NAO-governed
networks are also best suited for managing the tension between the
need for both network diversity and unity, which it can achieve by
integrating and coordinating the actions of network members (Saz-
Carranza & Ospina, 2011). By occupying the NAO role, The Depart-
ment of the Taoiseach is using its position and authority to instigate a
new level of climate policy integration in Ireland (van Asselt
et al., 2015). It is overseeing changes in organizational behaviours
through administrative coordination and is pushing for the successful
implementation of the plan by managing the publication of quarterly
progress reports. It is noteworthy in this regard that the NAO in this
case is the Department of the Taoiseach rather than the Department
of Environment, Climate and Communications. As a more central and
powerful actor, the Department of the Taoiseach is arguably better
placed to undertake this NAO role, which may lead to a stronger ver-
sion of climate policy integration. It is not possible on the basis of our
analysis to reach such a conclusion, but this topic is worthy of further
investigation.
Perhaps the most notable limitation of this study is that the rela-
tionships between actors in the implementation network are concep-
tualized and measured as binary phenomena, that is, they are either
present or absent. As a result, similarly to other studies that analyse
network ties as being binary, we do not consider the qualitative differ-
ences in the nature of the relationships between different pairs of
actors. However, the nature of the relationship between any pair
of actors in the network can be understood by consulting the Climate
Action Plan, where the reason for the relationship between each pair
of actors is described in detail.
The nature of our study—being a single case study—means that
any attempt at generalizing from our findings should be undertaken
with caution. Indeed, Ireland is distinctive in several important
respects. As noted above, Ireland is a highly centralized state with
comparatively weak structures for local government (Dekker, 2020).
In a climate change context, Ireland's GHG emissions profile is also
highly unusual, with agriculture accounting for 35% of total emissions
in 2019 (EPA, 2020). New Zealand is the only other developed coun-
try with such a high share of GHG from agriculture. For historical and
cultural reasons including stemming from Ireland's late industrializa-
tion, the agricultural sector wields political clout arguably dispropor-
tionate to its importance to the contemporary economy. These
factors combine to create particularly challenge context for the gover-
nance of climate change.
In order to overcome the limitations of a single country case
study, future research could compare several countries to investi-
gate whether certain kinds of climate policy implementation struc-
tures produce more successful policy outcomes than others. To
the extent that these structures consist of policy implementation
networks, the combination of the network methods and theoreti-
cal insights on the cross-sectoral and multi-level nature of these
networks we have developed in this paper can be used in such
studies. While comparative studies on networks involved in formu-
lating national climate change policies do exist (Kammerer
et al., 2021; Ylä-Anttila et al., 2018), we are not aware of
comparative research on networks involved specifically in climate
policy implementation. Undertaking such research would help in
assessing whether the network properties we found in Ireland
(dominance of the national level, relatively low cross-sector collab-
oration, NAO leadership) are a product of the specificities of the
Irish context (e.g., the centralized nature of the institutional struc-
ture there) or whether they characterize climate policy implemen-
tation networks more generally.
In June 2020, a new Irish government was formed, with the
leader of the Green Party, Eamon Ryan, being appointed as Minister
for the Environment, Climate and Communications. In late March
2021, his department published a Climate Action Bill that commits Ire-
land to a 51% reduction in emissions by 2030 and to carbon neutrality
by 2050. Alongside this, a public consultation was launched to pre-
pare a new Climate Action Plan, which will set out the actions to be
taken to meet the emissions reductions targets. Those responsible for
developing the new plan should consider how the structure of the
cross-sectoral and cross-level ties in the network can contribute to
meeting the NAO's governance challenge of managing and improving
climate policy integration in Ireland.
ORCID




1 There are actions in the plan where all the country's local authorities are
named as being responsible for their implementation. As such, we treat
local authorities as one single actor in cases where they are not named
individually.
2 In the Irish State Administration Database, they are referred to as policy
domains. We refer to them here as sectors to differentiate them from
the climate policy domain, which encompasses all these domains to
some degree.
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